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1 - Introduction 
The spatial competition litterature provides a fairly good description of the 
interaction of two selllers located in a market segment and competing for the 
consumers distributed along that segment. The game is usually modeled as a 
two-stage game. In the first stage the firms select locations anticipating the 
competition in prices, as in Hotelling (1929), or in quantities, as described in 
Beckmann and Thisse (1986 pp. 47-49}, in the second. This litterature turns 
mainly around two questions: does the locational pattern of the firms in equi-
librium entail minimum or maximal differentiation? In the case of price compe-
tition, is there a Nash price equilibrium for all firms' locations, i. e. is there 
stability in competition? Both questions were addressed by Hotelling in his 
1929's paper and the latter question engendered an important research field 
which began with D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). 
This paper tries to deal with some aspects of spatial competition which 
have been less discussed by the existing litterature. 
Spatial competition models are usually static. The impact of the improve-
ment of transport technologies which appears through decaying transport rates 
in time is seldom dealt, although the subject has been introduced by Launhardt's 
(1885) seminal work and it is implicitly present in Smithies (1941 ). 
Most spatial oligopoly models are symmetric, both in what concerns the 
productive efficiency of firms and the spatial distribution of consumers. 
Lastly, most spatial competition models use only one kind of competition 
in the second stage of the game, either price or quantity competition. 
Therefore the paper seeks to describe the impact of the decay of the trans-
port rate, due to the improvement of transport, on the equilibrium of a spatial 
oligopoly in the context of a comparative static framework. This impact is seen 
to depend critically on the existence of asymmetry either in the unit production 
costs or in the spatial distribution of consumers. This result is robust with rela-
tion to the kind of competition retained (price or quantity competition). 
The first part of the paper contains a spatial duopoly inspired by Launhardt 
(1885) where the price-competing firms locate at the extreme points of the unit 
interval, along which consumers are distributed with uniform density. When the 
transport rate decreases, customers are transferred from the relatively ineffi-
cient firm to the more efficient one. If following Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse 
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(1992), we assume that the firms play a two-stage game where the firms choose 
first specific transport rates in a bounded interval and then compete in price, 
the choice of the lower bound transport rate by the more efficient firm depends 
on the existence of a sufficient level of asymmetry between consumers. 
The second part of the paper, which is remotely inspired in Smithies 
(1941 ), features competition in quantity by two firms which locate in a set of 
two towns with different consumer populations connected by a transport line. 
Consumers have price elastic demand functions. If the distribution of consum-
ers in space is very asymmetric, both firms locate in the larger town for every 
value of the transport rate. In the case where the spatial distribution of con-
sumers is more balanced, two alternative outcomes may arise. If the transport 
cost is high, the firms locate in different towns, with each firm oriented towards 
local demand. When the transport cost decreases below a certain critical level 
(which is seen to depend inversely on the ratio of the population of the smaller 
town to the population of the larger town), both firms locate in the larger town, 
thus being oriented towards the central point of the spatial distribution of con-
sumers. 
2 -Transport and asymmetry in productive efficiency 
We suppose a market situation which was described by Launhardt (1885). 
The assumptions are: 
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1) The spatial market is the interval [0, 1]; 
2) Consumers are uniformly distributed along the market with unit 
density; 
3) Two firms producing a homogeneous product locate at the ex-
treme points of the interval; 
4) Firms compete through the quotation of fob mill prices p1 and p2 ; 
5) Each consumer pays a delivered price which is equal to the sum 
of mill price and transport cost between firm and consumer loca-
tions; 
6) Transport cost between the firm and the consumer corresponds 
to the product of a constant transport rate t by the distance be-
tween the firm and the consumer; 
7) Each consumer buys a unit of product per unit of time; 
8) Each consumer buys the product with the lowest delivered price; 
9) Firms have different unit production costs c1 and c2, with c1 > c2 
without loss of generality. 
FIGURE 2.1 
Spatial market 




Consumers are divided into market areas whose border is point x, char-
acterized by the equality of delivered prices: 
2.1 
Once solved 2.1 becomes: 
2.2 
We remark that x == D1(p1 ,p2) (demand addressed to firm 1) and 
1 -X= 02(p1,p2) (demand addressed to firm 2). Profit functions are: 
7t1 == (p1- c1)01(p1,p2) 
n1 == (p2- c2)02(P1 ,p2) 





It is obvious that p*1 and p*2 are strictly increasing functions of t increas-
ing transport cost decreases the degree of substitution between products and 
raises prices. Diminishing transport cost increases the intensity of competition 
with a negative effect on prices. 
Substituting p*1 and p*2 from 2.5 and 2.6 in 2.2, we obtain the border of 
the market areas as a function of t. 
(t) 
C2 - c, 1 X ==--+-
6t 2 
2.7 
This function is depicted below in figure 2.2. 
Function x(t) is increasing, concave and converges asymptotically to ..2_ . 
The function reaches a zero at: 
2 
t == c2- c, 
6t 
2.8 
As was remarked by Launhardt (1885), the improvement in transport shifts 
customers from the relatively inefficient to the low cost firm. 
How does each firm's profit change with the improvement in transport? 
1) The improvement in transport unambiguously decreases the profit of 






x (t) function 
x(t) Frontier of market areas 
Unit transport cost 
2) The effect of the improvement in transport on the profit of the more 
efficient firm is ambiguous because it decreases the firm's price with a nega-
tive impact on profit and it increases its market area with an opposite effect. 
Substituting the Nash equilibrium prices from 2.5 and 2.6 in the more ef-
ficient firm's profit function (expressed by 2.4) we obtain a function 1t2(t): 
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Firm 2's profit 
2.10 
t Unit transport cost 
It can be noticed that when the transport cost is high in relation to the 
difference between the unit production costs, the effect of the decrease in trans-
port cost on firm 2' s profit is negative: the price effect overcomes the positive 
effect on market share. On the other hand, when the difference between the 
unit production costs is high in relation to transport cost, the latter's decrease 
enhances firm 2' s profit: the positive effect on the market share overcomes 
the negative effect on price. 
Following Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1992), we can endogenise the 
selection of transport technology by assuming that the firms play a two-stage 
game: 
First stage: firms select simultaneously their specific transport tech-
nologies, as expressed by transport rates t1 and t2. Transport 
rates are bounded to interval [1,7]; 
Second stage: firms quote simultaneously prices p1 and p2. 
We study the equilibrium of this game in appendix A. We conclude there 
that to select the upper bound transport rate t is a dominant strategy to the 
less efficient firm in the subgame of transport rates. Therefore the solution of 
the game can studied by means of the payoff function of the efficient firm only. 
In what follows, we present a heuristic version of the game, by supposing that 
there is a unique transport rate in the market which is selected by the more 
efficient firm. The more efficient firm chooses his transport technology and the 
less efficient firm is constrained to follow it. The heuristic game can be modeled 
in the following way: 
First stage: the most efficient firm selects a transport technology ex-
pressed by t. The choice of t is bounded to the interval [ t, t]; 
Second stage: the firms compete in prices. 
Subgame perfect equilibrium is the pertinent concept of equilibrium. 
As the function depicted in figure 2.3 is convex and is defined in a closed 
interval, it reaches the maximum at an extreme point of the interval. A suffi-
cient (although not necessary) condition for it to reach a maximum at t is: 
or: 2.11 
The above expression means that the most efficient transport technology 
will be chosen in equilibrium if the difference of productive efficiency is high 
enough. In this case, market areas in equilibrium will be very unequal, the most 
efficient firm supplying almost the whole market. On the contrary, if production 
cost differences are relatively low, the high transport cost technology is cho-
sen and market areas become alike, the most efficient firm supplying slightly 
more customers than the other firm. 
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3 - Transport and asymmetry in the spatial distribution of demand 
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Represents the spatial structure of the economy: 
FIGURE 3.1 
Spatial structure of the economy 
------- ...... 
.......... , 
' ' 'I 
Town A Town B 
The assumptions are: 
1) There exist two towns that are connected by a transport line; 
2) All consumers and firms locate in the towns; 
3) Two firms produce and distribute a homogeneous good; 
4) The transport cost of the good in the distance between the two 
towns is named t, 
5) The population of town A, n
8
, is higher than the population of town 
8, nb; 
6) Each consumer's inverse demand function is p = 1 - q; 
7) Firms' unit production costs are equal (equal to 0, to simplify). 
We consider a two-stage game: 
First stage: firms choose locations; 
Second stage: firms compete through the selection of quantities sold 
in each town. 
The payoff matrix in the first stage is: 
Firm 2 Town A Town 8 
Firm 2 
Town A 1t1(A,A) 1t1(A,8) 
1t2(A,A) 1t2(A,8) 
Town 8 1t1(8,A) 1t1(8,8) 
1t2(8,A) 1t2(8,8) 
The following relations stem from the symmetry of the firms: 
1t1(8,A) = 1t2(A,8); 
1t2(8,A) = 1t1(A,8); 
1t1(A,A) = 1t2(A,A); 
1t1(8,8) = 1t2(8,8). 
Because of the symmetry of the firms, we only need to study the quan-
tity and profit equilibria in two cases: the two firms have identical locations 
(e. g., they locate in A; but if they locate in B the same results would hold); 
the firms have different locations (e. g., firm 1 locates in A and firm 2 in B). 
Terminology: 
q1a• q1b, q2a,q2b-quantity sold by a firm (1,2) in a market (a,b); 
n1a, n1b, n2a, 1t2b- profits generated by sales q1a, q1b' q2a,q2b; 
1t1 = 1t1a + 1t1b; 1t2 = 1t2a + 1t2b- aggregate profits of firm 1 and 2; 
Oa = q1a + q2a; Ob = q1b + q2b- aggregate quantities sold in towns 
A and B. 
First we consider the case corresponding to locations (A,A). In market A, 
profit functions of the firms are: 
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium follows: 
Profits which correspond to the equilibrium quantities in 3.3 are: 
* • na 
1t 1a = 1t 2a = -9-
In market B profit functions are: 
1t1b(q1b'q2b) = q1b [1 -q,b :b q2b)- ~ 
1t2b(q1b'q2b) = q2b [1- q,b:b q2b)- ~ 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is: 
• • nb (1 - t) 
q1b=q2b= 3 
The profit functions in equilibrium are: 










We infer from 3.3 and 3.7 and from 3.4 and 3.8 that total quantities sold 
by each firm and their total profits are monotonic decreasing functions of the 
transport cost. We remark that the condition t < 1 should hold for sales and 
profits in the distant market (B) to be positive. 
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Now we consider now the case (A,B): firm 1 locates in town A and firm 
2 is based in town B. 
Profit functions in town A are: 





Profit functions in town B are: 





The expressions of Nash equilibrium quantities depend on whether trans-
port cost is higher or lower than ...!.... For t > ...!..., each firm sells only in its local 
2 2 
market. For t < ...!..., each firm exports to the distant market thus generating posi-
2 
tive cross flows. Therefore, for q"1a we have: 
3.13 
• na f t 1 q =-or >-1a 2 2 3.14 
For q·2a we have: 
• _ n8 (1 - 2t) f t < __:1_ q 2a- 3 or - 2 3.15 
• f 1 q = 0 or t>-2a 2 3.16 
Functions q·1a(t) and q·2a(t) from 3.13 to 3.16 are both continuous, the 
former increasing and the latter decreasing in t. The improvement in transport 
determines the substitution of local products by imported products from the 
other town. 
By symmetry, through exchanging subscripts a and b, and also 1 and 2 




While q'2a is: 
3.19 
• n, 1 
q =___.._for t>-
2b 2 2 3.20 
The aggregate quantity consumed in equilibrium in market A is by defini-
tion: 
From 3.13 to 3.16, we have: 
• n 1 
Q =..:.:a...._ fort>-
a 2 2 
3.21 
3.22 
Function Q'a(t) [and the same for Q'b(t)] is continuous and decreasing: 
consumption grows in each market as a result of the transport improvement. 
Firm 1' s equilibrium profit which is raised in the two markets is by defi-
nition: 
1t'1a, firm 1' s profit from sales in market A is easily calculated by substi-
tuting 3.13 to 3.16 in 3.9, with the result that: 
• n 1 
1t = .....:..:.L for t>-
a 4 · 2 3.23 
• na (1 + t)2 f t < 1 1t = or __ 
a 9 2 3.24 
On the other hand, 1t.b can be found substituting 3.17 to 3.20 in 3.11, 
with it thus resulting that: 
3.25 
• nb (1 - t)2 for t::;; ~ 
1t 1b = 9 2 3.26 
Through aggregation of 3.23 and 3.25 and of 3.24 and 3.26 firm 1' s total 
profit achieved in both towns is: 
• n 1 




It is easy to show that for t < -}: 
drr:"1 O "f na 2- 4t --> I->--
dt nb 1 + t 
3.29 
The right hand side of inequality 3.29 is an increasing and convex func-
tion whose zero occurs in t = + and that takes value 2 for t = 0 (cf. fi-
gure 3.2). 
FIGURE 3.2 


















We infer from figure 3.2 that firm 1' s profit (firm 2 being located in B) 
decreases monotonically with the transport cost if ~ > 2. If 1 < ~ < 2 holds, 
nb nb 
firm 1' s profit first decreases and then increases when t falls below _!__. With 
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the application of a symmetric reasoning, the latter assertion holds for firm 2' s 
profit. This behaviour arises from two conflicting effects: 
The improvement of transport expands quantities sold in each mar-
ket, which has a positive effect on profit 
The transport improvement raises freight through the substitution of 
outside market sales for sales in the local market with a nega-
tive effect on profit. 
Two propositions can be demonstrated concerning the equilibrium of lo-
cations in the first stage game. 
Proposition 1 - (B,B) is not a location equilibrium (v. proof in appen-
dix B) 
This proposition means that when both firms locate in the smaller market 
it always pays off for each of them to move unilaterally to the larger market. 
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Proposition 2- If the distribution of the population between the markets 
is very asymmetric, e. g. if ...!!E... ::; ~. the equilibrium of locations is (A,A) for 
na 
9 
n t4 1 J every value of the transport cost. If _b belongs to the interval -,- , the 
na 9 2 
equilibrium of locations will be (A,B) if: 
(~ 1 -~ 9 - na 
4 nb 
and it will be (A,A) otherwise. If ~: belongs to the interval t~ , ~ the equi-
librium of locations will be (A,B) if: 
t ~ 1 - ..!!£.... (v. proof in appendix C) 
na 
and will be (A,A) otherwise. 
The parameter space is depicted in figure 3.3: 
FIGURE 3.3 
The space of parameters 
9 2 
The proposition means that when the distribution of population is very 
asymmetric, both firms locate in equilibrium in the larger market. If the distri-
bution of population is more balanced, the equilibrium of locations depends on 
the transport cost. When the transport cost is high, the equilibrium of locations 
entails a firm in each market, so that the firms are oriented towards local 
demand. For low values of transport cost, production is concentrated in the 
larger town, so that production is oriented to the central point of the spatial 
distribution of consumers in order to maximize accessibility to demand in the 
whole market (2). 
(2) More precisely, firms locate at the median and mode of the distribution of consumers 
rather than at the mean, which is an intermediate point between A and B that is excluded by 
assumption. 
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4 - Conclusions 
In a spatial oligopoly where there exist differences of unit production costs 
among the firms, a decrease in transport cost shifts customers away from the 
less efficient firm to the lower cost one. If we assume that the firms play a 
two-stage game where the cost leading firm first selects the transport technol-
ogy and then the duopolists simultaneously select prices, two outcomes may 
arise. If the difference in unit production costs is important, the best transport 
technology will be chosen and the firms will have markedly unequal market 
areas. Otherwise the worst transport technology prevails and firms have mar-
ket areas of similar extent. 
If the spatial distribution of demand is very asymmetric, firms locate in equi-
librium at the larger market for every value of the transport cost. If the distribution 
is more balanced two outcomes may arise. With high transport cost each firm's 
location is oriented towards local demand and firms are spatially dispersed. If the 
transport cost is low, firms cluster at a central point of customer distribution. The 
critical level for the transport cost depends inversely on the ratio of the population 
of the smaller town to the population of the larger one. 
Therefore in the case where the population distribution is relatively bal-
anced, the improvement in transport technology may have adverse effects. The 
decrease of the transport rate with given locations of firms increases quanti-
ties consumed by all customers. However when t reaches the critical value 
where relocation of the firm in the smaller market occurs, the change in trans-
port is not Pareto improving. Although the aggregate consumption does not 
decrease, the quantity demanded in the smaller market strictly decreases on 
account of the loss of local production (3). 
The two models presented above share the feature that the impact of the 
improvement of transport on the equilibrium solution is related with the magni-
tude of asymmetries. While this relation is direct in the case of asymmetry in 
productive efficiency, with a high level of asymmetry implying a large impact 
of transportation improvement, it is inverse in the second model. There a 
strongly asymmetric distribution of the population implies that the decrease of 
the transport rate, however strong, does not change the locational pattern of 
firms. The locational impact of the transport improvement occurs only when 
the spatial distribution of population is relatively balanced. 
How do economic asymmetries in the context of decaying transport rates 
rank from the viewpoint of welfare? The models presented above enable us to 
say that asymmetries are welfare-enhancing. Production cost asymmetries pro-
vide an incentive for the progress of transportation, which otherwise would be 
nonexistent. On the other hand, strong asymmetry in the spatial distribution of 
population makes the progress of transport Pareto-improving, while for lower 
levels of asymmetry this property is absent. 
(3) The result that, with price elastic demand, the firms are dispersed in space in equilib-
rium when the transport cost is high and tend to cluster at a central point of the spatial distribu-
tion of consumers as transport improves, holds for any shape of the distribution (provided it is 
non-degenerate) and any kind of competition. For instance, Smithies (1941) showed that this re-
sult holds if the distribution of consumers is uniform and firms compete with prices. 
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APPENDIX A 
Two-stage game with firm-specific transport rates 
t1 and ~ are the firm-specific transport rates. Then the market area border x is determined 
by the equality of delivered prices: 
so that x is: 
p1 + t1x = p2 + ~(1 - x) 
p,-p,+t, 
X=---
11 + t, 
The profit functions of the firms are: 
) ( ) ( 
(p,-p,+t,) 





We assume a two stage game, where the firms in the first stage select simultaneously trans-
port rates and, in the second stage, compete in prices. Transport rates are bounded to the inter-
val [ t,t). Working by backward induction we find a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The first order conditions in the pricing subgame are: 
Together they yield Nash equilibrium prices p"1 and p"2 as functions of t1 and ~: 
A.5 
• (t t) _ 12 +2<;+211 +c1 
p 2 1' 2 - 3 A.6 
It is clear from A.5 and A.6 that p"1 and p"2 are strictly increasing functions of t1 and ~: to 
increase the transport rates reduces the intensity of price competition. 
Substituting A.5 and A.6 in A.2, we obtain the market area border x at the Nash price 
equilibrium as a function of the transport rates: 
A.7 
It can be easily checked that x" is a strictly decreasing function of t1 and a strictly increas-
ing function of ~- This result is expected: a firm increases its market area by improving its trans-
port technology. 
On the other hand, we wish to assess the impact of a general improvement in transport 
technologies, i.e., we seek to determine the sign of the directional derivative of x" (t1, ~) in the 
direction (-1,-1). We conclude easily that: 
sign grad x"(t1, ~) · (-1, -1) =sign (~- t1) + 2(c2- c1) A.B 
As c2 < c1, the directional derivative is negative either if t2 < t1 or, if ~ > t1, the module of 
the diference among the transport rates does not exceed twice the module of the difference among 
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unit production costs. The meaning of this is clear: if the firm with higher production cost does not 
compensate its productive inefficiency through a marked advantage of efficiency in transportation, 
an overall improvement in transport shifts consumers from it to the firm with low production cost 
Substituting A.5, A.6 and A.7 in A.3 and A.4, we obtain the payoff functions in the first 
stage of the game: 
We can prove very easily the following lemma. 
(2t, + c, + t2 - c2)2 
9(t, + t,) 
A.9 
A.10 
Lemma- In the transport rate subgame the relatively inefficient firm has a dominant strat-
egy which consists in selecting the upper bound transport rate t 
This lemma follows very easily from the fact that firm 1 's profit in A.9 is strictly increasing 
in the·firm's transport rate. Therefore the solution of the game depends only on firm 2' payoff 
function in A.1 0. It is easily seen that function n2(t1, ~) is convex and has a minimum at: 
FIGURE A.1 
n2(t,, ~) function 
Firm 2's profit 
A.11 
t, Unit transport cost of firm 2 
The maximum of function n2(t1, t2 ) must occur either at tor 7. A sufficient condition so that 
the more efficient transport technology is selected is: 
A.12 
Whenever it is selected in equilibrium by firm 2, the transport rate t will prevail in most of 
the market segment, as firm 2 has a market area strictly higher than one half the length of the 
market. The adoption of an efficient transport technology is therefore dependent on the existence 
of a sufficient degree of productive asymmetry among the firms (1). 
(1) Remark that condition A.12 is less strict than condition 2.11. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Proof of proposition 1 
We assume according to reasons above explained that t E [0,1]. Firm 1' s total profit func-
tion when both firms locate in 8 is: 
According to 3.8 and 3.4 by symmetry (exchanging subscripts a and b), we have: 






From 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3, it follows that firm 1' s total profit when both firms locate in 8 is: 
8.4 
Assume now that t::; ...:___ According to 3.28, firm 1' s total profit when it locates in A and the 
rival remains in 8 is: 
2 
8.5 
It is easy to prove that n8 > nb is a sufficient condition that n1 (A,8) > n1 (8,8 ). 
Assume now that t > ...:___ According to 3.23 and 3.25, firm 1' s profit when firms have differ-
2 
ent locations is: 
8.6 
We can conclude easily that also in this case n8 > nb is a sufficient condition that 
n 1(A,8) = n1(8,8 ). Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX C 
Proof of proposition 2 
For reasons acounted above, we suppose that t e [0, 1]. As a first case, we assume that 
t > ~- Then firm 2's profit when firms locate in different markets is (according to 3.27 by ex-
2 
changing subscripts a and b): 
C.1 
Firm 2' s profit when both firms locate in A (according to 3.4 and 3.8) is: 
C.2 
Then the condition that 1t2(A,8) = 1t2(A,A ) is equivalent to 
C.3 
The r. h. s. of inequality C.2 is a decreasing and convex function of ~ over 
cannot be a location equilibrium if ..!!£.... < ~- n. 
[:, ~J (A,B) 
n. 9 
Assume now that t::; ..!.... From 8.5 by symmetry (exchanging subscripts a and b, and 1 and 
2 
2) firm 2' s profit, when it locates in 8 and the rival is based in A, becomes: 
C.4 
On the other hand, from 8.4 by symmetry we get finm 2' s total profit when both firms lo-
cate in town A: 
C.5 
It is easy to show that condition: 
means that: 
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